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The Social Consequences of Conspiracism:  Exposure to Conspiracy Theories Decreases the Intention to Engage in Politics
Conspiracy theories can be described as attempts to explain the ultimate causes of events as secret plots by powerful forces rather than as overt activities or accidents (McCauley & Jacques, 1979).  For example, conspiracy theories relating to the death of Diana, Princess of Wales often suppose that she was murdered by the British government as opposed to being killed in an unfortunate car accident.  These types of conspiracy theories are widespread (Swami & Coles, 2010) and accompany many significant political and social events, such as the death of Princess Diana (Douglas & Sutton, 2008), the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2010) and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy (McCauley & Jacques, 1979; McHoskey, 1995).  Research has shown that conspiracy theories are becoming more popular with interest in some conspiracy theories even increasing as the events become more distant (Goertzel, 1994).  For example, a survey in 1963 found that 29% of respondents believed the official account that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in assassinating President Kennedy, but in 2001 only 13% of respondents believed the official account (Carlson, 2001).  This finding points to the increasing popularity of conspiracy theories, and their persistence over time (Moore, 1990).
Although public interest in conspiracy theories may be increasing, there has been surprisingly limited empirical research examining the psychological underpinnings of beliefs in conspiracy theories (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999).  Further, much of the work that does exist has categorised believers as paranoid individuals whose judgements are somehow “distorted” as a result of an “uncommonly angry mind” (Hofstadter, 1971, pp. 2-3) or as a product of psychopathology, paranoia or delusional ideation (e.g., Groh, 1987; Plomin & Post, 1997).  However, this account may be too simplistic and incomplete considering how widespread conspiracy beliefs are in society (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009; Swami & Coles, 2010; Waters, 1997).  It is difficult to imagine that millions of conspiracy believers all suffer significant psychological symptoms.  More recent research has taken a less pathological perspective on conspiracy beliefs, demonstrating that there are several key sub-clinical correlates such as anomie, distrust in authority, political cynicism, powerlessness (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010) and Machiavellianism (Douglas & Sutton, 2011).
Further, research suggests that conspiracy theories may change the way people think about social events.  For example, after exposure to conspiracy theories about the death of Princess Diana, Douglas and Sutton (2008) found that participants were more inclined to endorse conspiratorial explanations, even though they perceived that their beliefs had not changed.  Also, Butler, Koopman and Zimbardo (1995) found that people who had viewed the film JFK – which highlights several prominent conspiracy theories surrounding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy – were more inclined to disbelieve official accounts than those who had not yet viewed the film.  These findings demonstrate that conspiracy theories can have a “hidden impact” (Douglas & Sutton, 2008, p. 217) on people’s attitudes and raises an intriguing question: What social consequences might there be for people who are exposed to conspiracy theories?  
Scholars have begun to consider what some of these consequences might be.  It is argued that there may be both positive and negative consequences of being exposed to non-mainstream explanations.  For example, conspiracy theories may allow individuals to question social hierarchies and as such encourage governments to be more transparent (Swami & Coles, 2010).  Indeed, some conspiracy theories reveal actual anomalies in mainstream explanations, such as in the US Department of Defence’s plans to stimulate acts of terrorism and attribute them to Cuba (Swami & Coles, 2010).  On the negative side, one prominent conspiracy theory proposes that birth control and HIV/AIDS are a form of genocide against African Americans (Bird & Bogart, 2003).  Research has found that amongst African Americans, endorsement of this theory is associated with negative attitudes towards contraceptive behaviors, which can have potentially negative consequences for the prevention of pregnancy and sexually transmitted illnesses (Bogart & Thorburn, 2006).  It is likely that other conspiracy theories (e.g., climate change conspiracy theories and theories about the dangers of child immunization) have similar negative consequences and prevent people from taking positive social action.  In the current study, we focus specifically on the influence of conspiracy theories about sinister government plots and schemes on the extent to which people choose to engage in politics and society.   
Civic engagement is defined as “encompassing a multitude of ways that citizens can connect with the larger society” (Pritzker, 2008, p.1).  Research has shown that civic engagement can be split into three different types of behaviors: these being political, civic and voice (Jenkins, Andolina, Keeter & Zukin, 2003).  Political behaviors consist of actions such as voting and wearing campaign stickers.  Civic behaviors consist of volunteering for different organisations and raising money.  Finally, voice behaviors consist of more expressive actions such as writing letters and protesting. 
Research has shown that these three types of behaviors have decreased across the world over the last decade (Fiorina, 2002; Niemi & Weisberg, 2001; Rosenstone & Hansenm, 1993; Putnam, 1995; 2000).  For example, people are voting less than they did ten years ago, attending fewer political meetings, forgoing wearing campaign stickers, signing 30 per cent fewer petitions, and are 40 per cent less likely to join a consumer boycott (Fiorina, 2002; Putnam, 1995; 2000).  There can be many reasons for this, such as decreasing interest in politics or the election process, time constraints, people feeling that their vote would not make a difference or even due to citizens not being as closely connected with each other as they once were, and subsequently interacting with each other less (File & Crissey, 2010, Fiorina, 2002, Putnam, 1995; 2000).  
Another key contributor to decreasing levels of civic engagement may be the influence of exposure to conspiracy theories.  In the age of the Internet, people are constantly bombarded with information relating to conspiracy theories, and there is an increasing ease with which information about such theories can be distributed (Coady, 2006).  We already know that exposure to conspiracy theories changes people’s attitudes without their awareness (Douglas & Sutton, 2008).  It is therefore plausible to propose that the ever increasing presence of conspiracy theories – particularly about secret government operations – may influence people’s intentions to engage in society.  For example, governmental conspiracy theories may discourage citizens from voting because they persuade people that the government is involved in shady deals and plots.  Indeed, there is some suggestion that this may be the case in the specific example of the movie JFK where people who had seen the film showed less intention to make political contributions than those who had not (Butler et al., 1995).  The current study further explored this possibility with a wide range of prominent governmental conspiracy theories.  Specifically, we examined the extent to which exposure to conspiracy theories influences political, civic and voice intentions.  
For the first time, we also examined the potential factors that may mediate such effects.  First, research has linked beliefs in conspiracy theories with low levels of trust (Gortzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).  In addition, research has suggested that a possible reason for the observed drop in civic engagement could be the decline in trust people have for the government (Fiorina, 2002; Putnam, 1995; 2000).  It is therefore possible that exposure to conspiracy theories influences civic engagement because conspiracy theories decrease levels of trust.  Second, feelings of powerlessness – specifically towards the government – were also explored as a potential mediator.  As defined in Stern’s (2000) Values-Beliefs-Norms theory of behavior, powerlessness is referred to as the perception of being incapable of affecting an outcome by taking action.  Research has demonstrated that powerlessness is associated with conspiracy beliefs (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).  In addition, some research has linked powerlessness with a lack of engagement in areas such as starting one’s own business (Khaola, 2010).  It is therefore possible that exposure to conspiracy theories increases feelings of powerlessness, which subsequently decreases civic engagement intentions.  
Third, we tested the potential mediating role of uncertainty towards the government, which is viewed as a product of the immediate situation or wider social context (De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005; Sorrentino & Roney, 2000).  It has been argued that a situation may influence the degree of uncertainty a person experiences, and the way that it is expressed, so that uncertainty can change with the environment (Smith, Hogg, Martin & Terry, 2007).  It is therefore plausible to suppose that exposure to conspiracy theories increases uncertainty.  This uncertainty may then lead to decreased intentions to become engaged in society.  Finally the potential influence of disillusionment – the feeling of disappointment that something is not what it was believed or hoped to be – was explored.  Research has shown that disillusionment after becoming aware of shortcomings may lead to a breakdown in engagement in a particular context (e.g., Niehuis & Bartell, 2006; Waller, 1938).  It is therefore plausible to suppose that exposure to conspiracy theories may increase feelings of disillusionment at being tricked and deceived by the government.  This disillusionment may then lead to decreased intentions to become engaged in society and political processes.  
There were therefore two aims to this research.  First, we explored the potential consequences of exposure to conspiracy theories on intentions to engage in society.  To do so, we exposed participants to an article that (a) argued in favour of a series of governmental conspiracy theories, or (b) argued against the same conspiracy theories.  Participants exposed to the pro-conspiracy arguments were expected to endorse governmental conspiracy theories more than those who had been exposed to the anti-conspiracy arguments.  Further, we hypothesized that exposure to information supporting conspiracy theories should decrease intentions to engage in society (political, civic and voice intentions).  Finally, the study directly tested four potential mediators of these predicted effects – specifically, feelings of mistrust, powerlessness, uncertainty and disillusionment towards the government.
Method
Participants and Design
One hundred sixty eight undergraduate and postgraduate research students (60 men and 108 women, Mage = 22.87, SD = 5.00) at a British university participated in the study. Participants were recruited via poster advertisements, emails and the use of the social networking site Facebook where they were invited to complete an online questionnaire.  The independent variable was the nature of the article presented to participants (pro-conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy), and was manipulated between-subjects.  A manipulation check measured participants’ judgements that a series of governmental conspiracy theories are true.  Scales of intended civic engagement formed the dependent variables.  Participants also reported feelings of mistrust, powerlessness, uncertainty and disillusionment towards the government which were measured as potential mediators for the predicted effects.
Materials and Procedure
  Two articles were used to either expose participants to information that supports conspiracy theories (pro-conspiracy condition) or information that refutes conspiracy theories (anti-conspiracy condition).  The pro-conspiracy article began by arguing that governments are involved in secret plots and schemes.  It then continued to provide specific examples of conspiracy theories such as the death of Princess Diana and the London 7/7 terrorist bombing attacks.  An extract from the conspiracy article is as follows:
“…To take the example of Princess Diana’s death, it is no secret that the British government were discontented with Princess Diana’s involvement with Dodi Fayed and also with her increasing involvement in politics… one must therefore question the claim that her death was simply a tragic accident…”. 1
The anti-conspiracy article was similar in content to the pro-conspiracy article but crucially differed by using the same broad and specific examples to argue that governments are not involved in conspiracy theories. This is therefore consistent with a mainstream account of events.  An extract from the anti-conspiracy theory article is as follows:
“…To take the example of Princess Diana’s death, it is no secret that Princess Diana’s popularity made some members of the government uneasy.  However, there is no evidence at all to suggest that the British government were involved in her death... her death was simply a tragic accident... ”.
The term ‘conspiracy theory’ was not mentioned in either of the articles.  To check that the manipulation was successful, participants rated the likelihood that a series of governmental conspiracy theories are true.  These were adapted from previous research (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; 2011; α = .90).  There were 12 statements in total with a mix of general (e.g., “governments are often involved in international plots and schemes”, α = .80) and specific (e.g., “the British government was involved in the death of Princess Diana”, α = .90) conspiracy theories.  For each statement, participants were asked to rate the likelihood that each is true (1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely likely). 
Participants next completed a four-item scale measuring mistrust towards government (Van der Meer, 2010).  Participants indicated the extent to which they trusted the government (e.g., “I have trust in Parliament”, α = .85) on a six-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree).  
A three-item scale measuring powerlessness towards the government was developed from Neal and Groat (1974) and Aarts and Thomasse (2008).  Participants were asked to read the statements (e.g., “The world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do about it”, α = .82) and rate their agreement (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree).
 A four-item scale was used to assess a person’s feelings of uncertainty, specifically concerning the government.  This scale was adapted from the Attributional Confidence Scale (Clatterbuck, 1979).  Participants read a series of statements (e.g., “the government is only run for the benefit of those in power”, α = .83) and rated the extent to which they agree that each behaviour could be predicted (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree).  High agreement demonstrates a greater prediction that the government would perform those behaviors, demonstrating a greater sense of uncertainty about the government as a whole. 
A four-item scale measured participants’ feelings of disillusionment, specifically about the government.  This scale was adapted from Niehuis and Bartell (2006).  Participants read a series of statements (e.g., “I am very disappointed with the government”, α = .76) on which they rated their agreement (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree).
Finally, the dependent variables measured the three facets of participants’ intended civic engagement.  Questions were adapted from previous research so that participants’ responses reflected intended rather than previous civic engagement (Jenkins et al., 2003; Pattie, Seyd & Whiteley, 2003).  There were 31 statements in total asking participants about their intended behaviors over the next 12 months.  The statements were split into three separate sections.  The first sub-set of questions related to the extent to which participants intend to take part in election behaviors (n = 7; e.g., “will you vote in the next election”, α = .80); the second related to other civic behaviors (n = 9; e.g., “do you intend to volunteer”, α = .87) and the third related to voice behaviors (n = 15; e.g., “do you intend to take part in a protest”, α = .90).   Participants responded by indicating their intention to participate in each behavior (1 = definitely no, 6 = definitely yes).  At the conclusion of the study, the participants were debriefed and thanked.
Results
Manipulation Check 
 	There was a significant difference between the two article conditions (pro-conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy) for endorsement of both general, F(1,166) = 16.70, p < .001, η2 = .09, and specific, F(1,166) = 16.65, p < .001, η2 = .09 conspiracy theories.  Participants who were exposed to information supporting governmental conspiracy theories endorsed general (M = 20.13, SD = 5.12) and specific (M = 18.20, SD = 9.56) conspiracy theories more than those in the anti-conspiracy condition (M = 17.0, SD = 4.88; M = 12.93, SD = 6.82, respectively), as predicted.  The manipulation was therefore successful. 
Conspiracy Theories and Civic Engagement
  A one-way ANOVA was conducted with article (pro- versus anti-conspiracy) as the independent variable, and summed scores on all three civic engagement questionnaires (political, civic and voice intentions) as the dependent measures.  Of the three dependent measures, exposure to conspiracy theories influenced only political behaviors, F(1,166) = 9.51, p = .002, η2 = .05.  Specifically, participants in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 17.39, SD = 7.10) showed less intention to engage in political behaviors than those in the anti-conspiracy condition (M = 20.89, SD = 7.60).  There were however no significant differences between the pro- and anti-conspiracy conditions for civic, F(1,166) = 0.311, p = . 578, η2 = .00, or voice behaviors, F(1,166) = 0.552, p = . 459, η2 = .00. 
Testing Mediation
Exposure to conspiracy theories therefore influenced intentions to engage in political behavior.  To test potential mediators of this effect, an ANOVA was firstly conducted with article condition (pro- versus anti-conspiracy) as the independent variable, and summed scores on all four potential mediators– mistrust, powerlessness, uncertainty and disillusionment – as dependent variables.  Results revealed that out of the four potential mediators, exposure to conspiracy theories only influenced powerlessness, F(1,166) = 13.07, p < .001, η2 = .07, and uncertainty, F(1,166) = 10.37, p = .002, η2 = .06.  Specifically, participants in the pro-conspiracy condition felt more powerless (M = 9.48, SD = 2.94) and uncertain (M = 13.65, SD = 3.49) towards the government than those in the anti-conspiracy condition (M = 8.01, SD = 2.27; M = 11.94, SD = 3.44, respectively).  There were no differences between the two conditions for mistrust, F(1,166) = 1.670, p = .198, n2 = .01, or disillusionment, F(1,166) = 2.48, p = .117, η2 = .01.
Each of the candidate mediators – powerlessness and uncertainty – was then examined in a test of multiple mediation in order to explain the effect of the pro- versus anti-conspiracy information on intended political behaviors.  This multiple mediation was carried out using Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping method for indirect effects.  This method is based on 5000 bootstrap re-samples used to describe the confidence intervals of indirect effects in a manner that makes no assumptions about the distribution of the indirect effects.  Interpretation of the bootstrap data is accomplished by determining whether zero is contained within the 95% confidence intervals, thus indicating the lack of significance.  Results from the current study are presented in Table 1 and Figure 1. 
First, there was a significant total indirect effect.  Importantly, the specific indirect effect in this test indicated that powerlessness was a significant mediator of the effect of pro- versus anti-conspiracy information on intended political behaviors, when controlling for uncertainty.  However the specific indirect effect of uncertainty was not found to be a significant mediator, when controlling for powerlessness, since its confidence interval contained zero.  Further, contrast testing between uncertainty and powerlessness revealed that the size of the mediation effect through powerlessness was significantly different than uncertainty (see end of Table 1).  This provides evidence that powerlessness is the driving mediator of the effect of exposure to conspiracy theories on intended political behaviors. 
Discussion
Psychologists are quickly learning more about the individual traits associated with beliefs in conspiracy theories (e.g., Abalakina-Papp et al, 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2010; Douglas & Sutton, 2011) and the extent to which conspiracy theories influence people’s attitudes about significant social and political events (Butler et al., 1995; Douglas & Sutton, 2008).  However, there is a need to understand what these effects entail.  The current research sought to examine some of the potential consequences associated with exposure to conspiracy theories.  
In the current study, participants were exposed to either a pro-conspiracy or anti-conspiracy account of events.  We measured participants’ intentions to engage in political, civic and voice behaviors, and found that exposure to conspiracy theories influenced participants’ intentions to engage in political processes such as voting.  We also found that this effect was mediated by participants’ feelings of political powerlessness.  Results of this study therefore suggest that people who are exposed to conspiracy theories may be less likely to engage in politics because they feel politically powerless.  
Demonstrating that exposure to conspiracy theories influences intended political engagement gives a hint to the extent to which conspiracy theories may be influential.  Voting and other forms of political engagement are decreasing around the world (e.g., Fiorina, 2002); demonstrating that intended political behaviors can be influenced by exposure to conspiracy theories suggests that decreased engagement could be due, in part, to how widespread conspiracy theories are in society (Swami & Coles, 2010).  This study has also extended previous research demonstrating how influential conspiracy theories can be (Butler et al., 1995; Douglas & Sutton, 2008).  Here, it has been demonstrated that while exposure to conspiracy theories can influence the extent to which the theory is endorsed, it can also influence a person’s behavioral intentions. 
Further, our findings demonstrated that feelings of powerlessness towards the government fully mediated the effect of pro- versus anti-conspiracy information on intended political behaviors.  This demonstrates that being exposed to governmental conspiracy theories increases feelings that one’s actions will have little impact, which subsequently lowers one’s intentions to engage in political behaviors.  This is consistent with results from a recent American census (File & Crissey, 2010); when asked why people did not vote, many responded with the reason that their vote would not make a difference.  
This study also extends previous research that reveals an association between powerlessness and endorsement of conspiracy theories.  In the current study however, we demonstrated that exposure to conspiracy theories directly influenced participants’ feeling of powerlessness towards the government.  Previous research has only been able to demonstrate correlations between endorsement of conspiracy theories and powerlessness without indicating the direction of the relationship (e.g., Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).  Whilst some individuals may endorse conspiracies to reduce their feelings of powerlessness (Swami & Coles, 2010), it can be suggested from the current results that exposure to conspiracy theories may also bring about feelings of powerlessness. 
Although uncertainty was shown not to be a significant mediator of the relationship between exposure to conspiracy theories and political behavior, it was demonstrated that participants who were exposed to conspiracy theories felt more uncertain towards the government than those exposed to an anti-conspiracist account.  This extends previous literature by providing evidence of a directional relationship between conspiracy beliefs and uncertainty.  There were however no reported effects of exposure to conspiracy theories on mistrust and disillusionment.  This was an unexpected finding as previous research suggests that mistrust is associated with conspiracy beliefs (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).  However due to the experimental design used in the current study, it may be that mistrust is only associated with conspiracy beliefs that are already strongly held.  It may therefore be difficult to manipulate trust by simple exposure to conspiracy theories.  This can similarly apply to disillusionment.  Therefore, although both mistrust and disillusionment were not influenced by the manipulation, it does not mean that they are not associated with pre-existing conspiracy beliefs and that they do not influence civic engagement at all.
Further, there was no effect of exposure to conspiracy theories on civic or voice-related behaviors in this study.  This is an intriguing finding and there can be a variety of reasons why only intended political behaviors were influenced.  In particular, all of the conspiracy theories used in the current study were associated with governmental plots and schemes.  It could be argued that aspects of behavior such as donating to charity and volunteering may be less influenced by governmental conspiracy theories than political behaviors, because they are less directly associated with political outcomes.  Our results also do not entail that other types of conspiracy theories – which refer to society more broadly and not specifically the actions of the government – will not influence civic engagement more generally.  For example, conspiracy theories relating to the Illuminati and the New World Order, which argue that powerful and secretive groups are plotting to rule humankind in a single world order (Hunt, 2008), may influence how engaged someone is in society more generally than simply predicting their political engagement.
In future research, we intend to explore other possible consequences of conspiracy beliefs.  For example if being exposed to government conspiracy theories leads to lower intentions to be engaged in political behaviors, other types of conspiracy theories may have significant social consequences.  An example of this may be conspiracy theories suggesting that global warming is a hoax set up by scientists.  If an individual is exposed to these conspiracy theories, they may be less likely to take positive action to reduce their carbon footprint. 
Conclusion
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Simple Mediation of the Indirect Effects of Information Type (pro- versus anti-conspiracy) on Political Behaviors through Feelings of Powerlessness and Uncertainty (N= 168; 5000 bootstrap samples) 




     Powerlessness        Uncertainty	1.85  (.60)-0.30 (.34)	0.84-1.07	3.200.30
     Total mediated effect	1.55 (.60)	0.50	2.88
Contrasts			
     Uncertainty -                                           Powerlessness	2.15 (.80)	0.87	3.92
Note. Boldface type highlights a significant effect as determined by the BCaa 95% confidence interval (CI) which does not contain a zero.





Multiple mediation test of the relationship between information type (pro- versus anti-conspiracy) and intended political behaviors















Adj R2 = .21, F(3,164) = 15.64, p < .001
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